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CASE NOTES
evidentiary issue regarding Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
national policy in labor-antitrust violation situations is in need of clari-
fication. This submission is supported by noting the three way division
of the Pennington Court and the number of justices dissenting in Ram-
sey. To resolve this situation, Congress must clarify its intent and the
national policy by introducing legislation defining the limits of labor's
exemption from antitrust liability. Union and employer representa-
tives need to know what subjects they may discuss at the bargaining
table, and what activities they may pursue, without fear of antitrust
liability. Absent such legislation, the collective bargaining process is in
danger of being driven underground, in contravention of the policy of
fostering that process as expressed in Section 2 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act."
The effect of the Court's decision in Ramsey is to reaffirm, clarify,
and give force to the Pennington doctrine and to define the evidentiary
standard required by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. However,
congressional action is needed to resolve the status of labor's exemp-
tion from antitrust liability in order to remove the danger which
existing ambiguities present to the collective bargaining process.
FRANCIS J. CONNELL
Trade Regulation—Antitrust Immunity—Quasi-Governmental Ac-
tion—Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. 1 —The Armory Board of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, a quasi-public body empowered to operate and
maintain federal government facilities in the district,' was authorized
by the federal Stadium Acta to build, operate and maintain an athletic
stadium.' Accordingly, under a contract with the Department of
Interior which previously had purchased the site, the Board built
R.F.K. Stadium and leased it to Pro-Football, Inc., the corporate
organization of the Washington Redskins football team. °
 The lease
provided that at no time during a thirty year term would the
Armory Board rent the stadium to any other professional football team.°
Relying upon this exclusive covenant, the Board refused to lease
78
 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
1
 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3081 (U.S.
July 23, 1971) (No. 71-121).
2 2 D.C. Code § 1706 (1967).
3 2 D.C. Code H 1720-78 (1967).
4
 2 D.C. Code § 1720 (1967).
5 444 F.2d at 932-33.
444 F.2d at 933. The exclusive covenant provided, in part, that:
[The Armory Board] . . . shall have the right to lease or otherwise permit the
use and occupancy of the Stadium during any period . . . provided that at no
time during the term of this Lease Agreement shall the Stadium be let or rented
to any professional football team other than the Washington Redskins.
Id. at 933.
393
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the stadium to the petitioners, three local businessmen who had
sought to operate a professional football franchise in the District' of
Columbia. The petitioners brought a private action under Section 4
of the Clayton Ace against the Redskins, the National Football
League and the three members of the Armory Board, 8 alleging
violations of Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act ° and claiming
damages therefor. They alleged that the exclusive covenant in
the lease constituted a contract in restraint of the business of pro-
fessional football in the District of Columbia and that the Redskins
had engaged in an attempt to monopolize, and had monopolized,
professional football in the District of Columbia.'° The defendants
contended that the execution of the lease by the Armory Board con-
stituted governmental action immune from the operation of the anti-
trust laws." Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
The District Court for the District of Columbia accepted the
defendants' contention, holding that:
[T]he leasing of the stadium was pursuant to the mandate
of the [Stadium] Act and was governmental action. As
such it was . . exempt from the antitrust laws . . . . No
violation of the [Sherman] Act can be made out even where
there is a restraint upon trade or monopolization if it resulted
from valid governmental action.' 2
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit HELD: reversed, anti-
trust immunity denied to the defendants." The court remanded the
case to the district court for consideration of the alleged Sherman Act
violations, stating that the thirty year lease had to be evaluated in
accordance with the antitrust laws as usually applied to contracts
between private parties." The district court's decision to grant im-
munity was predicated upon a finding that the execution of the lease
was in furtherance of and constituted valid governmental action. 18
The court of appeals, however, determined that the Armory Board's
7 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
8 2 D.C. Code § 1702 (1967). This section provides that the Armory Board is to be
comprised of the President of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia,
the Commanding General of the District of Columbia Militia, and a third person not
employed by the federal or District of Columbia governments.
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970). 	 .
10 444 F.2d at 932. The petitioners also alleged that the Redskins, the National
Football League and the individual Armory Board members all had conspired to restrain
and monopolize professional football in the district, that R.F.K. Stadium was the dis-
trict's only suitable location for professional football and that the Armory Board's
refusal to lease made it virtually impossible for them to obtain a professional football
franchise in the district. Id. at 932-33.
11 Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1970).
12 312 F. Supp. at 477.
13 444 F.2d at 932.
14 Id. at 947.
18 312 F. Supp. at 417.
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action pursuant to the lease .was not such a uniquely or essentially
governmental act as to warrant immunity. The court also ruled that
the Armory Board's action was not a policy decision that warranted
immunity. Furthermore, the court was unable to discern in the Stadium
Act any congressional intent to immunize the Board's action against
antitrust proscription.
Immunity for valid governmental action is an outgrowth of the
state action immunity judicially implied by the Supreme Court in
Parker v. Brown." The Court in Parker had to determine whether the
California Agricultural Prorate Act, 17 which authorized the establish-
ment of state agricultural regulatory programs, was violative of the
Sherman Act. The Prorate Act authorized the creation of an advisory
commission to regulate competition and prices in certain agricultural
commodities. The commission,' consisting of the State Director of
Agriculture and private individuals appointed by the Governor, had
the power to approve, disapprove, or modify programs proposed by a
program committee." The director . of the program committee was
required to institute and administer the program, if approved by a
referendum vote of the producers."
The plaintiff in Parker alleged, inter alia, that a raisin marketing
program adopted pursuant to the Prorate Act constituted a contract
or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The thrust of the complaint was
that private producers had been allowed to act in restraint of trade. 2 '
The plaintiff further alleged that the Prorate Act had been superceded
by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 22
 a federal
statute. The Supreme Court held the regulatory program to be valid
state action and therefore immune from the antitrust laws. Speaking
for the majority, Chief Justice Stone stated that:
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate pro-
gram made no contract or agreement and entered into no
10 317 U.S. 341 ( 1943) .
17 Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stat. 1969, as amended, West. Cal. Agric.
Code §§ 59501-60011 (West 1967),
18
 The regulatory programs which the advisory commission could approve were
those intended to conserve the agricultural wealth of the state and to prevent economic
waste in the marketing of crops. A program could be instituted for a particular corn-
- modity if the commission were petitioned to do so by ten private producers of that
commodity. 317 U.S. at 346.
19
 Upon petition for a prorate marketing program, a public hearing would be held
to determine whether the program could prevent agricultural waste without permitting
unreasonable profits to the producers. Upon an affirmative finding, the advisory com-
mission was authorized to grant the petition, The Director of Agriculture was authorized
to select a committee from a list of nominees chosen by the producers to formulate the
program. Id. at 346-47.
20 Id.
21
 Private growers were not only allowed to approve the program through referen-
dum, they were also members of the commission that regulated the program after its
institution. Id. at 352.
22 Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.
(1970).
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conspiracy in restraint of trade . . . but, as sovereign, im-
posed the restraint as an act of government which the
Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit."
In addition, the Court found that the Prorate Act had not been super-
seded by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. 24 The
Court apparently reasoned that the Sherman Act proscriptions were
not intended to apply to state governmental action even though that
action was initiated, and to some extent implemented, by private pro-
ducers. The 'Sherman Act's legislative history indicates that its pur-
pose was to suppress unlawful combinations involving individuals and
corporations, not states. 25
 Parker reflected this purpose in holding the
exercise of governmental functions immune from the antitrust laws.
Parker has recently been interpreted in E.W. Wiggins Airways,
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 28 a case factually similar to
Hecht. The plaintiff in Wiggins alleged that the Massachusetts Port
Authority," a quasi-public body, had entered into an agreement with
a private base operator" which restrained trade 29 by establishing an
exclusive maintenance operation at Logan Airport in Boston. The
district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff's
complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted."
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Port Authority's actions
in operating an airport under legislative mandate, and in entering into
the lease, constituted actions of "an instrumentality or agency of the
state"" which, under the Parker doctrine, were exempt from antitrust
proscription. The Wiggins court also dismissed the plaintiff's conten-
tion that the Port Authority was engaged in a purely proprietary
activity."
A most recent case raising the Parker immunity doctrine was
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc. 33 In
Whitten both parties were engaged in the manufacture of swimming
pool gutters. Paddock had attempted to influence an architect to
recommend Paddock's product specifications for adoption by a local
school board. The recommendation would give Paddock an advantage
23 317 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 354. The Court determined that the Marketing Act of 1937 contemplated
the existence of state programs at least until such time as the Secretary of Agriculture
established a federal marketing program. Id.
26 Id. at 350-51.
20 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966).
27 Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 91 app., (if 1-2 (1956).
28 362 F.2d at 53. A base operation provides facilities, fuel, supplies, and services
used by aircraft, crews, and passengers. Such an operation isorital to air transportation.
Id. at n.2.
29 Id.
80 Id. at 54.
81 Id. at 55.
82 Id.
22 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970).
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in the required competitive bidding procedures." Whitten alleged,
inter alia, that Paddock had violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act" by conspiring with its dealers and representatives to require the
use of its own specifications in the public swimming pool industry,
with the intent to exclude all other manufacturers."
The district court granted Paddock's motion for summary judg-
ment." However, on appeal, the First Circuit reversed, holding that
Paddock's attempts to influence the architect were not outside the
purview of the antitrust laws. The court indicated that Whitten was
distinguishable from both Parker and Wiggins by a consideration of
the degree of governmental involvement in, and supervision over, the
alleged wrongful activity. 38 The court did not believe that the architect
with whom Paddock had dealt was engaged in an essentially govern-
mental function." Furthermore, the Whitten court read Parker as
conferring antitrust immunity only when the legislature determines
that competition is not the summum bonum in a given field and
purposely attempts to provide an alternative to it through publiC
regulation." The court stated:
In the case at bar . . . the state policy is neither anti-
competitive nor neutral. When the government acts under
laws requiring competitive bidding, it signifies its intent to
respond to the signals of a competitive market ... an intent
. . . entirely consistent with the aims of the Sherman Act.
This intent would be frustrated . .. if some sellers could
nevertheless engage in anti-competitive practices merely
because they were dealing with the government. 41
In Parker the express legislative policy of the prorate program was to
regulate competition in order to stabilize the raisin industry. In
Whitten, however, there was no indication that the legislature wanted
to restrain or regulate trade. On the contrary, the competitive bidding
procedures evidenced a legislative intent to promote competition. The
Parker Court implied that before it would grant antitrust immunity
the activity in question had to be both uniquely and essentially govern-
mental in nature." In granting immunity, the Wiggins court empha-
34 Id. at 28. The public and quasi-public agencies forming the primary market for
both the Whitten and Paddock products operated under a multiplicity of state and local
bidding procedures. Id. at 27-28.
88 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
8° 424 F.2d at 27.
87 Id. at 26.
88 Id. at 30. See Comment, Alabama Power Company v. Alabama Electric Coop-
erative: Rural Electrification and the Antitrust Laws--Irresistible Force Meets Immov-
able Object, 55 Va. L. Rev. 325, 344-47 (1969), for a discussion of the Parker immunity
and the necessary degree of governmental action.
89 424 F.2d at 31.
40
 Id. at 30.
41 Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
42 317 U.S. at 350-52. The Parker Court indicated that the prorate program was
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sized the essentially governmental character of the Port Authority's
activity,'" apparently rejecting the Parker standard that the activity
must meet both elements before immunity can attach. In denying
immunity, however, the Whitten court went beyond these two charac-
teristics and placed its emphasis on the degree of governmental in-
volvement present." The Whitten court required the presence of signifi-
cant and pervasive governmental involvement rather than mere casual
governmental connection before it would grant immunity.
The court in Hecht first distinguished Parker by noting that the
immunized activity in that case had involved not merely state action
but state regulatory action." The Hecht court apparently indicated
that when governmental regulation is involved there is less need for
the proscriptions of the antitrust laws. A distinguishing feature of
regulated industries is that there is a lesser possibility of overreaching
by private parties due to the governmental supervision. In both Parker
and Wiggins public or quasi-public bodies had supervised or regulated
private activities. Although Wiggins involved only supervision over the
operation of Logan Airport, the case is similar to Parker in that the
private activity involved was an integral part of the proper operation
of the airport. In Hecht there was no governmental regulation of pro-
fessional football nor did the Armory Board have any responsibility to
evaluate the effect of its action on that industry. Furthermore, the
private activity involved was not essential for the proper operation of
the stadium.
In both Parker and Hecht private parties could cause a quasi-
governmental body to act in a manner that would possibly restrain
trade. In Parker commodity producers were instrumental in establish-
ing a regulatory program which would stabilize commodity prices.
Any resulting restraint upon competition was essential to the valid
governmental objective of securing agricultural stability. In Hecht,
the Redskins obtained an agreement from the Armory Board which,
if carried into effect, would prevent any professional football competi-
tion in the District of Columbia for thirty years." This possible re-
straint on competition is different in degree from that in Parker and, in
addition, is not aimed at accomplishing a valid governmental objec-
tive. This latter fact also distinguishes Hecht from Wiggins. In Wig-
gins the base operator was contributing to the overall governmental
function of the Port Authority, for the public's benefit, while in
essentially governmental by noting that although private parties proposed and approved
particular programs, the state created the machinery for establishing, adopting and
enforcing them. The Court further indicated that the prorate program was uniquely
governmental by noting that the antitrust implications of the regulatory scheme in' the
prorate program and the necessity for state penal sanctions to obtain compliance with
the program made it impossible for private parties alone to carry out the program. Id.
43 362 F.2d at 55.
44 424 F.2d at 30.
45 444 F.2d at 937.
46
 Id. at 933-34.
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Hecht, the Redskins were not directly contributing to any govern-
mental program.
In Parker, the Prorate Act was clearly uniquely governmental and
apparently essentially governmental so that Parker would seem to
imply that action must be both uniquely and essentially governmental
in order to be granted antitrust immunity. Wiggins, however, would
seem to indicate that the Parker immunity would apply to essentially
governmental functions not uniquely governmental, since the Port
Authority's operation of Logan Airport arguably was not unique to
government. In Hecht the Armory Board, as the lessor of R.F.K.
Stadium, was not engaged in a unique governmental function. As a
lessor of a football facility, the Board was engaged in a proprietary
activity in that it was caring for and operating governmental property.
The execution of the lease was similar to action taken by private pro-
prietors of other sports facilities. Since the Armory Board's action was
not uniquely governmental, the question then remains whether the
Armory Board's action was essentially governmental. The Hecht court
determined that it was not:
[W]hen Congress empowered the Armory Board to . . .
operate . . . [the Stadium], it was empowering the Armory
Board to do what another governmental agency . . . could
have done as straight forward governmental action. . . But
what Congress did not do is create the Board ... to own and
manage . .. [the Redskins]; hence . .. the Board . .
[is not] performing a function that a purely governmental
agency itself could have performed. 47
The Hecht court appears to imply that the Board's activity was clothed
with a private character in that the Board had, agreed to provide and
operate football facilities for a private enterprise. This arrangement
is in contrast to that of Parker where private producers, in implement-
ing a regulatory program, took part in a public activity. Furthermore,
Pro-Football, Inc. was not participating in a governmental function as
was the base operator in Wiggins. The Hecht defendant engaged in a
purely private undertaking, professional football, while merely using
government facilities. Under Parker then, Hecht appears to have been
decided correctly because neither uniquely nor essentially govern-
mental action was involved.
The Hecht court distinguished Parker on another important
ground. The court noted that in Parker the raisin prorate program
was harmonious with the federal statute that had established the
national agricultural regulatory programs." The Hecht court viewed
the federal statute in Parker as evidence of a congressional intent to
allow regulatory programs to restrain trade." In Hecht there was
47 Id. at 939.
48
 Id. at 937.
49 Id.
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available no federal statute, other than the Stadium Act, to which the
court could look to determine congressional intent. The court deter-
mined that the Stadium Act evidenced no such intent.
In granting immunity the district court in Hecht relied upon
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 5°
and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington. 5' The court of
appeals, however, ruled that these two Supreme Court cases were
inapposite. Noerr involved an alleged conspiracy by a number of
railroad companies to restrain trade in long distance freight hauling.
The petitioners, a group of trucking companies, alleged that the pur-
pose of a publicity campaign conducted by the railroads was anti-
competitive because it was designed both to impair the public image
of the truckers and to facilitate the passage and enforcement of laws
aimed at regulating the trucking industry." Despite the defendants'
anticompetitive motive, the Supreme Court held that the antitrust
laws did not prohibit private concerted attempts to persuade the legis-
lature or the executive to take actions resulting in a restraint of trade."
The Court focused upon two primary considerations in reaching its
decision. The first was the Court's concern with protecting the First
Amendment right to petition." The Court ruled that it could not
discern in the Sherman Act a congressional intent to infringe the right
to petition because nothing in the Act's legislative history indicated
an intention to regulate political activity. 55 Secondly, the Court rea-
soned that the power of the government to take action regulating trade
would be greatly impaired if industry's access to government legisla-
tors and executives were to be limited."
Pennington is said to have broadened the Noerr immunity to
include concerted anticompetitive efforts aimed at persuading "public
officials" to take action in restraint of competition." In Pennington
the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the United Mine Workers and
several large coal producers had conspired to restrain trade. The
defendants allegedly had attempted to curtail competition by obtaining
50 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
51 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
52 365 U.S. at 129. The complaint alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U,S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). The railroads admitted that the publicity cam-
paign had been designed to influence the passage and enforcement of laws, but denied
that they were motivated by a desire to interfere with the truckers' business. Id. at 129,
131.
53 Id. at 139-40.
54 The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall make
no law abridging the right of the people to petition the government. U.S. Const. amend.
I.
55 365 U.S. at 137. The Court prevented any possible infringement of the right to
petition by granting immunity without specifically defining the scope of that right.
58 Id. at 136-37, 139. The Court also stated that the right of the people to inform
their elected representatives should not depend upon either their intent or their financial
interest. Id. at 139.
5T See Comment, Antitrust Immunity: Recent Exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington
Defense, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1133, 1139-40 (1971).
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from the Secretary of Labor the establishment of a minimum wage"
for certain coal producers previously exempt from it," and by urging
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to curtail purchases from
other exempt producers." The Supreme Court held that these joint
efforts to influence public officials did not violate the antitrust laws
even though they were aimed at the elimination of competition." The
Court concluded that "[s]uch conduct is not illegal, either standing
alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman
Act."82
In finding the Noerr-Pennington immunity inapplicable, the
Hecht court placed great emphasis upon Whitten. The Whitten court
had distinguished Noerr and Pennington by noting that:
[Noerr's] . . . entire thrust . . . is aimed at insuring unin-
hibited access to government policy makers . . . . [T]he
efforts of ... [Paddock] to impose his product specifications
on [an] . . . architect hired by a local school board hardly
rise to the dignity of an effort to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws . . . . Noerr stressed the importance of
free access to public officials vested with significant policy
making discretion. We doubt whether Pennington . . . would
have extended the Noerr umbrella to public officials engaged
in purely commercial dealings. . . ."
The Whitten court felt that the concern of the Noerr Court regarding
the right to petition was of little significance in an essentially com-
mercial setting." In Hecht, since the Armory Board was not making
governmental policy but rather was acting in a proprietary capacity
in a commercial context, the court ruled that the Board occupied a
position similar to that of the architect in Whitten, and found Whit-
ten's interpretation of the Noerr-Pennington rationale applicable.
Even assuming that the Board's execution of the lease was a
policy decision, in that the Armory Board had to decide between an
exclusive or nonexclusive lease, this was not the type of policy deci-
sion protected by Noerr-Pennington. Noerr stressed the importance
of free access to public officials vested with significant policy making
58 381 U.S. at 660. The minimum wage would be established under the Walsh-
Healy Act, 41 U.S.C.
	 35-45 (1970).
50
 Id. at 660. The requirement that smaller coal producers comply with the minimum
wage would cause an increase in their production costs thus making their coal less com-
petitive. Id.
ce Id. The TVA would then have to purchase from producers complying with the
minimum wage. Id. at 660-61.
el Id. at 670.
02
 Id. The district court had instructed the jury that efforts to influence the Secre-
tary of Labor were illegal if they constituted part of a broader conspiracy to drive small
producers out of business. Pennington v. United Mine Workers of America, 325 F.2d
804, 817 (6th Cir. 1963).
00
 424 F.2d at 32-33.
04 Id. at 33.
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discretion and Pennington dealt with activity that could have had
industry-wide consequences. Success by the Pennington defendants in
their attempt to effect a change in the coal purchasing policy of the
TVA would affect all coal producers dealing with the TVA. In Hecht,
however, the Redskins' lease did not have industry-wide ramifications.
If the execution of the lease was in fact a policy decision, it was not
one of the same magnitude as those in Noerr and Pennington."
The Hecht court also found Trucking Unlimited v. California
Motor Transport Co." more applicable than either Noerr or Pennington.
In Trucking Unlimited a group of truckers allegedly had used its superior
financial position to oppose smaller competitors' license requests from
the California Public Utilities Commission. The Ninth Circuit held
that the Noerr-Pennington immunity was not applicable because the
defendant truckers were attempting to influence nonpolicy govern-
mental decisions, The Whitten court determined that Trucking Un-
limited had limited the scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to
situations where only attempts to influence legislative or executive
bodies involved in making policy decisions would be accorded antitrust
immunity. The holding in Whitten indicates that if a quasi-public or
public body acts in a policy making capacity then immunity should be
granted to protect the right to petition since policy decisions usually
involve basic political considerations. However, when a governmental
body acts in an essentially proprietary capacity in a commercial set-
ting, its decisions are or should be based primarily on economic, not
political, factors. Since Noerr was concerned with protecting efforts
of political persuasion, then, arguably, decisions based essentially on
economic grounds should not be immune." The Hecht court relied on
Whitten in this regard—apparently reasoning that the primary con-
siderations in executing the lease were economic. Hecht also deter-
mined that the government's ability to regulate trade, another concern
of the Noerr court, would not be impaired in denying immunity since
no policy decision to regulate trade was involved in the case." Hecht's
reliance on Whitten and Trucking Unlimited apparently was grounded
in a belief that the immunity developed in Noerr and Pennington was
overbroad. Both Whitten and Trucking Unlimited suggested that
courts should focus upon the nature of a party's activity to determine
whether it involves an attempt to influence public officials vested with
significant policy making discretion of a political nature. In denying
immunity, the Hecht court stressed both the nonpolicy and the pro-
prietary-commercial nature of the Armory Board's action.
The court considered and rejected the argument that the Stadium
65 444 F.2d at 947.
66 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3012 (U.S.
June 1, 1971) (No. 1419).
67 See Comment, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Govern-
ment Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 847, 854-55 (1968).
68 444 F.2d at 947.
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Act and its legislative history revealed an express exemption from the
antitrust laws." The court stated that it would find an express exemp-
tion for the action of the Armory Board only upon a showing in the
Stadium Act of a clear and specific congressional intent to grant im-
munity." The Stadium Act does provide that "[i]n order to carry out
the purposes of . . . [the Act], the Board is . . . authorized without
regard to any other provision of law . . . to determine all questions /
concerning the use of the stadium . . . [and] to rent or lease . . . the
stadium . . . . "71 The defendants in Hecht relied upon this clause to
show an express exemption. In interpreting the meaning of this provi-
sion, however, the court pointed to a limitation in the Act providing
that no contract in excess of three thousand dollars was to be executed
without competitive bidding, 72 and stated that it would be inconsistent
for Congress to exempt the execution of the lease from antitrust
proscription while subjecting other contracts in excess of three thou-
sand dollars to competitive forces. In addition, the court, in a manner
similar to that of the Whitten court, regarded the competitive bidding
provision of the Stadium Act as evidence of a legislative intent to
maintain competition among private parties with whom the Board
dealt." The Hecht court also noted that had Congress intended to
exclude the applicability of the antitrust laws it would have done so in
statutory language as clear and specific as that used in the provision
requiring competitive bidding practices.74
The court was unable to find any support in the Stadium Act's
legislative history to show that by the clause "without regard to any
other provision of law" Congress had intended to place the Armory
Board's actions beyond the scope of the antitrust laws." Determining
that the inferences to be drawn from the legislative history supported
the opposite hypothesis, the court focused on a report of the Chairman
of the Senate's District of Columbia Committee, which discussed the
Stadium Act. The Chairman had reported that:
The [District of Columbia] committee felt that, inas-
much as the stadium is to be, in the nature of a private ven-
ture, it was more desirable that the Board be vested with
the authority to make its own decisions as to the letting of
the concessions, without placing restrictions upon the Armory
Board."
69 Id.
70 Id, at 945.
71 2 D.C. Code § 1723 (1967).
72 2 D.C. Code § 1723 (1967). Subsection 3 states that the Board is authorized to
acquire property and equipment and to sell or dispose of such property except that no
contract for more than $3,000 shall be entered into without competitive bidding. Id.
is4 I4 d4.4 F.2d at 945.T
75 Id.
76 103 Cong. Rec. 13567 (1957) (remarks of Senator Bible) (emphasis added).
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The court interpreted this statement to mean that, because the stadium
was in the nature of a private venture for some purposes, the Com-
mittee's intention was for the Armory Board "to be free from the
aegis of .. . [certain] regulations applying to government agencies
which would hamper functioning as a private business.' 77 Conse-
quently, the phrase in the Stadium Act, "without regard to any other
provision of law," was meant by Congress to refer only to regulations
applying to government agencies, such as federal procurement regula-
tions, not to the antitrust laws."
Since Congress had explicitly granted antitrust exemptions in the
past,79 the Hecht court determined that -it could not interpret the
general language of the Stadium Act as bestowing an express exemp-
tion. Exemptions from the antitrust laws have generally been expressly
granted by statute for governmentally supervised industries that re-
quire controlled competition." Anticompetitive activity that is usually
prevented by the antitrust laws is here prevented or regulated by a
governmental agency. Antitrust proscription is not required since it
would interfere with the governmental control." Further, Congress
has provided limited antitrust exemptions to both regulated and un-
regulated industries for special business reasons. 82 Where certain in-
dustries enjoy limited antitrust exemption, they are often subject to
special legislation which parallels the federal antitrust laws." In
Hecht the antitrust laws might have interfered with governmental
supervision in the sense that the Board was a supervisory body
authorized to maintain and operate R.F.K. Stadium." While applica-
tion of the antitrust laws might have interfered with the Armory
Board's complete discretion with respect to the stadium, the Board's
supervisory authority was proprietary and not regulatory in nature so
that its supervision could not be deemed to displace the antitrust laws
in controlling anticompetitive activity. Furthermore, the Hecht court
was able to find no special business considerations which would have
justified antitrust exemption. The court was unable to discern any-
thing in the surrounding circumstances indicating that the exclusive
convenant in the lease was necessary in order to induce the Redskins
77 444 E.2d at 946.
78 Id.
79
 The Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests Act, 15 U.S.C. §,§ 1291-95
(1970), is a good example of an explicit antitrust exemption. Section 1291 provides that
"[t]he antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons
engaging in or conducting organized professional team sports . . . by which any league
of clubs participating in professional . . . [sport] contests sells ... all or any part of
the rights of such league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games. . . ."
80 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970); 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
81 See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 195-202, (1939), for an interesting
discussion of the scope of an expressed antitrust immunity.
82 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. f 17 (1970), in which labor organizations are given an anti-
trust exemption.
83 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 522 (1970); 7 U.S.C.	 192-93 (1970).
84 2 D.C. Code 1720 (1967).
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to sign the lease. Whether the Redskins would have signed the lease
without the thirty year exclusive provision is speculative." However,
because R.F.K. Stadium is the only suitable site for professional foot-
ball in the District of Columbia, the court decided that the Redskins
probably would have signed the thirty year lease even without the
exclusive provision." Therefore, the Hecht court concluded that no
special business considerations existed which would justify a liberal
reading of the Stadium Act.
Having concluded that the Stadium Act did not provide an ex-
press exemption from antitrust proscription, the Hecht court then
attempted to determine whether Congress, in the Act, knowingly had
adopted a policy contrary to the antitrust laws thereby impliedly
exempting the Armory Board's activities. The court stated that, since
both the Stadium Act and the antitrust laws were federal statutes,
"the proper inquiry [isj . . . to what extent Congress has knowingly
adopted a policy contrary to or inconsistent with the previously
established antitrust laws . . . . "87 A similar inquiry is made when a
court must determine which congressional intent prevails in a reg-
ulated industry when the antitrust laws conflict with a private action
taken with the approval of the regulatory body.
In this regard, the Hecht court discussed two Supreme Court
decisions, Silver v. New York Stock Exchange" and United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank." In Silver, two nonmembers of the
New York Stock Exchange who had been denied telephone connections
on the Exchange" alleged that the Exchange and several of its mem-
bers had conspired in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act in
refusing to deal. The Exchange claimed that as a national stock ex-
change it was a regulated industry under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,01 and was thereby exempt, to the extent regulated, from
the antitrust laws." The court in Silver had to reconcile the antitrust
laws with a public policy, expressed in the Securities Exchange Act,
which contemplated that securities exchanges would be engaged in a
form of self-regulation that might produce anticompetitive effects."
85 444 F.2d at 946.
80 Id.
87 Id. at 935.
88 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
89 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The Hecht court also cited United States v. El Paso Natural
Gm Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) and United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376
U.S. 665 (1964), in regard to the implied immunity issue. In both cases the Supreme
Court held that the granting of broad powers to a regulatory agency did not render the
antitrust laws inapplicable. 444 F.2d at 943.
99 373 U.S. at 344. The plaintiffs maintained that these telephone connections were
essential to their business on the exchange floor. Id. at 344-45.
91 15 U.S.C. II§ 78a et seq. (1970).
92 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The
Exchange argued that the plaintiffs' telephone connections had been terminated pursuant
to its constitution and that its action was therefore outside the scope of the antitrust
laws. Id.
98 373 U.S. at 349.
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Since the Securities Exchange Act contained no express exemption
from the antitrust laws, the Court stated that any repeal of the anti-
trust laws would have to be discerned by implication." The Court
held that the Securities Exchange Act did not impose upon the Ex-
change a duty of self-regulation so extensive and complete as to
constitute an implied repeal of the antitrust laws," and that, therefore,
it could not immunize the Exchange from their operation." The Court
ruled in Silver that an implied repeal would be found only if necessary
to allow the Securities Exchange Act to function properly and, even
then, only to the extent necessary." In Philadelphia National Bank,
the Court held that bank mergers approved by the Comptroller of
the Currency were not immune from the antitrust laws despite the
Comptroller's power to consider competitive factors prior to approv-
ing mergers." The petitioner sought an injunction under Section 7 of
of the Clayton Act" to prevent a bank merger approved by the Comp-
troller. The defendants contended that the Bank Merger Act,'" in
directing the Comptroller to consider competitive factors, impliedly
immunized the merger from challenge under the antitrust laws. Re-
jecting this argument, the Court held that the antitrust laws applied
to the merger, noting that an implied repeal of the antitrust laws
by a regulatory statute is strongly disfavored?'
Both Silver and Philadelphia National Bank involved regulatory
action based on federal statutes. In the former, the Securities Ex-
change Act imposed upon the New York Stock Exchange a duty of
self-regulation, while in the latter, the Bank Merger Act required the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to regulate proposed merg-
ers. In both cases the Court examined both the regulatory body's
responsibility to consider antitrust matters and the pervasiveness of
the regulatory pattern. In neither case was the Court able to discover
in the regulatory statutes a preeminent congressional intent to pre-
empt the operation of the antitrust laws. Since the antitrust laws serve
to insure that individual businesses will compete unhindered by con-
certed anticompetitive actions, a court that finds an antitrust exemp-
tion without also finding an overriding and preeminent congressional
intent would undermine congressional purpose. Silver and Philadelphia
National Bank also indicate that preemption of the antitrust laws will
not be judicially implied unless they directly conflict with a statute
designed to accomplish a significant public objective. In both cases the
Court ruled that even if found, an implied exemption would have been




98 Id. at 360-61.
97
 Id. at 357.
08 374 U.S. at 351-52.
00 15 U.S.C. 18 (1970).
100 12 U.S.C. I} 1828 (1970).
101 374 U.S. at 348.
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applied only to the extent necessary to make the particular act or
program operative.
The Hecht court, in accord with both Silver and Philadelphia
National Bank, was unable to find the congressional intent to exempt
from antitrust purview action taken pursuant to the Stadium Act. The
court noted as significant the fact that in both Silver and Philadelphia
National Bank there existed regulatory statutes embodying govern-
mental policy of an importance equal to that of the antitrust laws." 2
The court examined the Armory Board's responsibilities and its "super-
visory" scheme and concluded that while the maintenance of a stadium
for the District of Columbia was of considerable importance to the
people of the district, the Stadium Act did not further a policy as im-
portant as that regulating securities exchanges or banks."' Since in
neither Silver nor Philadelphia National Bank could the Supreme
Court find an implied exemption despite the important congressional
objectives embodied in the conflicting regulatory statutes, the argu-
ment that the Stadium Act impliedly preempted the antitrust laws
appears spurious. Furthermore, antitrust proscription in Hecht would
not vitiate the purpose of the Stadium Act nor make the Act's imple-
mentation substantially more difficult, for it could not be conclusively
shown that the exclusive thirty year lease was essential for the opera-
tion of R.F.K. Stadium. Thus, it appears that the Hecht court was
correct in concluding that the Stadium Act embodied no overriding
congressional intent to displace the operation of the antitrust laws.
Viewed in light of the facts in Hecht, the shortcomings of the
Parker immunity become evident. In Parker the Supreme Court did
not elaborate precise criteria for determining when antitrust immunity
should be granted to governmental or quasi-governmental action but
instead simply categorized the regulatory process in that case as
governmental action. A broad reading of Parker made possible the
extension of immunity to many areas where the government was only
remotely involved. However, the Parker immunity has been both
explicitly defined and narrowed by Hecht. The court in Hecht refined
the government immunity doctrine by suggesting that its application
be preceded by a close analysis of both the kind and degree of govern-
'mental activity. The court realized that the danger present in broadly
applying the Parker immunity was that the antitrust laws may thereby
be implicitly repealed, or at least, unduly infringed. Further distinc-
tions in both the kind and the degree of the governmental action in-
volved will be necessary to prevent an abridgement of the antitrust
laws by private parties who deal with an increasing number of state
and federal governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. Hecht also
examined the Noerr7Pennington doctrine and indicated that when a
quasi-governmental body is acting in an essentially proprietary capac-
ity and its decisions are based primarily on economic factors, the
102 444 F.2d at 946.
108 Id. at 947.
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concern of the Noerr Court with the right to petition is of little im-
portance. Furthermore, Hecht properly evaluated and applied the
criteria used by the Supreme Court in Silver to determine that the
congressional intent expressed in the Stadium Act did not preempt
that of the antitrust laws. The rationale of the Hecht court has con-
siderable merit and should provide the basis for further distinctions
in the area of antitrust immunity.
FREDERICK J. DEANGELIS
Administrative Law—Reviewability of Final Orders under the
FIFRA—Limits on Administrative Discretion—Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus.1 —In October, 1969, the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. (EDF) and other public interest organiza-
tions representing ecological priorities petitioned the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture 2 under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 8 to issue notices of cancellation for
the registrations of all products containing DDT and to suspend
immediately those registrations because of the imminent hazard posed
to the public health by widespread use of DDT '. The Secretary issued
notices of cancellation for four uses of DDT, 5 but he deferred his
decision on the remaining uses pending a preliminary study of the
matter. He took no action on the request for suspension.
In December, 1969, the petitioner sought review of the Secre-
tary's action in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia' The Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
1
 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
2
 The functions of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act have been transferred to the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency. 5 U.S.C. App. § 2(8)(i)(1970).
a 7 U.S.C. § 135-135k (1970).
4 The statutory grant of authority contained in the FIFRA gives the Administrator
considerable discretion to determine whether the registration of an economic poison
should be immediately suspended. The Administrator may order suspension when he
determines that a pesticide does not conform with a provision in the FIFRA or when
he finds that such action is necessary to prevent an imminent hazard to the public. The
Administrator must give the affected party notice of such action and, if the party is a
registrant, must afford him the "opportunity to have the matter submitted to an advisory
committee and for an expedited hearing." The suspension procedure maintains the status
quo and allows the registrant to submit evidence refuting any claim that the pesticide
presents a danger to the public health. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c)(1970).
5 34 Fed. Reg. 18827 (1969). The cancellation notices directly affected the following
uses of DDT:
(a) all uses on shade trees, including elm trees, for control of the elm bark
beetle which transmits the Dutch elm disease;
(b) all uses on tobacco;
(c) all uses in or around the home except limited uses for control of disease
vectors, as determined by public health officials;
(d) all uses in aquatic environments, marshes, wetlands and adjacent areas,
except those which are essential for the control of disease vectors, as deter-
mined by public health officials.
6 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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